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This article bridges Sri Lankan studies and the academic debate on the relation
between contemporary Islam and politics. It constitutes a case study of the
Muslim community in Akkaraipattu on Sri Lanka’s war-ridden east coast.
Over two decades of ethnically colored conflict have made Muslim identity of
paramount importance, but the meanings attached to that identity vary substan-
tively. Politicians, mosque leaders, Sufis and Tablighis define the ethnic, religious
and political dimensions of “Muslimness” differently and this leads to intra-
Muslim contradictions. The case study thus helps resolve the puzzle of Sri
Lankan Muslims: they are surrounded by hostility, but they continue to be
internally divided. Akkaraipattu’s Muslims jockey between principled politics,
pragmatic politics and anti-politics, because they have to navigate different tra-
jectories. This article thus corroborates recent studies on Islam elsewhere that
argue for contextualized and nuanced approaches to the variegated interface
between Islam and politics.
INTRODUCTION
WHEN MUSLIMS PRAY ON a ferry, an Indonesian friend once told me, they areconfronted with a challenge to their everyday routine. As the boat maneu-
vers across the ocean, its orientation in relation to Mecca, and thus the direction
of prayer, changes. During challenging routes and stormy weather this may result
in frequent changes in the mise en scène (and frequent runs to the railing or the
bathroom for those with a weaker stomach). This metaphor illustrates that reli-
gious practice and affiliations do not remain unaffected when navigating
through new terrain. Changes in context generate questions of orientation, iden-
tity and boundaries.
The interaction between religion and politics features saliently in the aca-
demic debate on contemporary Islam. Globalization, Islamic revival and
reform in conjunction with modern politics have made for a tantalizing mix of
processes (see Soares and Osella 2009 for an overview of the discussion).
While Islamists revived the concept of a caliphate and liberals charged that
democracy is inherently secular, academic research has sought more nuanced
ways of scrutinizing the nexus between religion and politics. It has highlighted
the manifold ways in which religious symbols and ideas have penetrated politics.
Similarly, political contestation and patronage have blended with religious
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identity, religious movements and religious governance. Various authors have
pointed towards the socio-economic processes of modernization: how education,
rationalization, urbanization, and the emergence of a middle class produced
Islamic revival movements that challenged and overthrew the “traditional” religious
elites (e.g. Bayat 2007; Eickelman and Piscatori 1996; Hasan 2007; Hefner 2000).
The interface between Islam and democratic contestation thus came forward as
multi-faceted in various case studies (Bayat 2007; Hefner 2000; Sidel 2007; Tepe
2008). It is in this tradition of exploring the paradoxes and complexity of everyday
religious and political practice that this article is written.
Sri Lanka’s Muslims – a group of about 1.6 million people, constituting 8.7
per cent of the national population (Census Department 20081) – have barely
featured in these wider debates on Islam. Apart from its historic connection to
Islam around the Indian Ocean (McGilvray 2008), this group is of particular
interest because of Sri Lanka’s recent history of violent conflict, which has
impacted on the connections between religion and identity politics. Competing
ethno-nationalism between Sri Lanka’s two largest population groups – Sinhalese
and Tamils – put pressure on societal boundaries and identities (Goodhand and
Klem 2005). From the 1980s onwards, the Muslims in the north and east of the
country found themselves on the frontline between Tamil separatists and govern-
ment counter-insurgency troops. The case of the Sri Lankan Muslims thus con-
nects contemporary Islam to a context of war and ethnic tensions. That brings us
to the questions this article aims to address: how did the war interact with
Muslim identities? And how, in turn, has this encounter affected the interaction
between Islam and politics? Surprisingly, the Sri Lankan literature on these ques-
tions is very thin. There are relevant accounts of Muslim history, of ethnic contesta-
tion, and of contemporary politics as well as some ethnographic work on Islam, but
very little that draws connections between ethnic, religious and political realms,
while it is those connections that explain many of the tensions and paradoxes we
witness among Sri Lankan Muslims. This article will explore these inter-relations
using a detailed case study of Akkaraipattu, a town on Sri Lanka’s east coast.
This coastal strip is the place where Muslims are demographically most significant
in Sri Lanka. Akkaraipattu is one of various Muslim pockets, but it is of particular
relevance because the town is one of the few places where Muslims and Tamils live
in similar numbers. The availability of good anthropological and historical work on
Akkaraipattu (McGilvray 1982; 2008) was another reason to select this town.
Faced with common threats and enemies, one would expect Muslims to
stand together in a place like Akkaraipattu. A bolstered ethnic and religious iden-
tity would converge with a more militant political outlook, and even jihad inspired
violence could easily be imagined. But this proves to be a mistake. It becomes
1This is a rough estimate. Census figures are from 2001, but for seven districts (Batticaloa,
Trincomalee, Mullaitivu, Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Vavuniya and Mannar) the latest available data are
from 1981.
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clear from my findings as well as existing literature (Lewer and Ismail 2011;
McGilvray and Raheem 2007) that decades of ethno-nationalism and armed con-
flict have not produced homogeneity or unity among Sri Lanka’s Muslims in the
war zone. On the contrary, I argue the war has affected Muslim identity in para-
doxical ways and divergent interpretations of that identity have resulted in new
intra-Muslim fault lines and contradictory political orientations. I contend that
Akkaraipattu’s Muslims have become more politically engaged, but – both for
religious and practical reasons – they have also turned their back on politics.
The result is an everyday jockeying between political and anti-political behavior,
an everyday survival strategy that navigates between multiple boundaries and dis-
courses. Apparently commonsensical contradictions – between religious funda-
mentalism and ethno-nationalism, between personal piety and collective
politics, between modernity and tradition – exist, but they explain little as
people blend and circumvent them.
The empirical material presented in this article is based on a sequence of
fieldwork visits to eastern Sri Lanka in 2007 and 2008, and more generally on
visits to the eastern region, more or less annually, from 2000 till the present.
I stayed in Akkaraipattu for several weeks at a time to collect data, make obser-
vations and interview (in English or with Tamil or Sinhala translation) a wide
range of people from different ethnic, religious, class, and political backgrounds.
During the fieldwork in 2007 and 2008, 122 interviews were held2 and it is from
these encounters that I draw the core empirical material. The analysis emerged
through a sequence field visits, group discussions with colleagues and academics
from the region and joint seminars with a broader research team.3
2I made sure to speak with the religious leaders of different denominations, including maulavis,
mosque administrators, Sufis, and leading members of Islamic reform movements. In addition,
I interviewed Buddhist, Hindu and Christian leaders of different denominations, and other
respected citizens, mainly school principals, journalists, local politicians, and businessmen. I also
met with people who were not in leadership positions, some of whom in fact lived in rather
deprived circumstances, for example in tsunami relocation schemes. In the region surrounding
Akkaraipattu and in the capital Colombo, Sri Lanka, I interviewed people higher up in the religious
hierarchies. Of the 122 interviews, 106 were with men, 8 with women, and 8 with men and women
together. In terms of professional background, 43 were with religious leaders, 37 with “normal” citi-
zens, 20 with NGO staff, 15 with respected businessmen and senior citizens, 4 with civil servants
and 3 with politicians. Ethnically, 61 interviews were with Tamils, 47 with Muslims, 6 with Bur-
ghers, 5 with Sinhalese, 2 with expats and one with Kuravars. The religious division was as
follows: 47 were Muslims (of which 2 Jamaat Islami, 4 Sufism, 11 Tabligh Jamaat), 44 were Chris-
tians (21 Catholic, 14 Methodist, 9 Evangelical), 18 were Hindus, 3 were Buddhists and in 10 cases,
the religious background of the interviewees was either mixed or unknown to me. Many of the
initial respondents were known to one of my Sri Lankan colleagues, some of whom were them-
selves respected citizens of Akkaraipattu. Given that these colleagues came from different
ethnic, religious and regional backgrounds, they also connected me to rather different groups of
people. In addition, I made sure to get in touch with people in other ways, by attending ceremonies
or simply entering offices to get an appointment.
3The core members of this team were Jonathan Goodhand, Shahul Hasbullah, Benedikt Korf,
Tudor Silva and Jonathan Spencer.
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Some of the interviews had a highly performative character, because the infor-
mants saw it as a pious act to educate me.4 In other cases I had difficulty getting
access as an outsider, for example with the leaders from Tawhid Jamaat (the smallest
Islamic reformmovement in Akkaraipattu) who refused tomeetme5, or in capturing
the view of female Muslims. In most cases, however, people were very willing to talk
to me openly and took pleasure in telling me about their religious views and experi-
ences. This was in part dependent on the time period. The study period was a vola-
tile time of change, due to the turbulent political and military events. The everyday
ebb and flow of tensions and incidents affected the space to talk. There were nomili-
tary clashes in Akkaraipattu itself, but battles in the region as well as assassinations,
round-ups and other forms of violence obviously affected people’s willingness to
speak and the way they emphasized or de-emphasized sensitive issues.
ISLAMIC REVIVAL AND POLITICS
The primary aim of this article is to help fill the voids in our understanding of
religious and political practice among the Muslim community in contemporary
Sri Lanka. Before I delve into that context, it is necessary to conceptually scruti-
nize religion and politics.
In general …
Studies of religion are impeded by a definitional problem – its institutional,
behavioral, spiritual and other facets are not easy to reconcile. In this article
I de-emphasize the theological angle. I do not treat religion as an
all-encompassing system of truth or an ensemble of personal or collective
beliefs. Instead, this article takes a sociological focus and analyses religion
through its social and institutional manifestations, though for many of my infor-
mants such a worldly interpretation would amount to heresy, as it transfers
agency from God to people and reduces the divine, the magical and the spiritual
to mere constructs that shape human behavior. This sociological perspective
draws from Bourdieu’s work and as pointed out by Sidel (in a different
context), it treats religion as a “field structured by its own institutions, authority
relations, instilled dispositions (habitus), means of production and accumulation,
and representation of symbolic or spiritual capital […].” (Sidel 2007, xi)
Though inherently worldly, the political is no less elusive conceptually; its
red-taped boundaries tend to shift depending on time, place and interpretation.
4Members of the Islamic reform movement Tabligh Jamaat were a good example. Dressed as if
attending a religious ceremony, they would let a rosary pass through their fingers as they extolled
the virtues and purity of their movement. I tried to complement these formal discourses with a
more grounded and everyday perspective by meeting people more than once and in divergent,
informal contexts as well as by searching for people with different views.
5I did manage to interview them in other towns, including Kattankudy.
Islam, Politics and Violence in Eastern Sri Lanka 733
Labeling something as “political” or “apolitical” is itself a political act that delin-
eates a normative space and apportions (il)legitimacy. Jonathan Spencer’s (2007)
book on politics in South Asia underlines the conceptual problems of defining
politics. He takes issue with the separation of formal and everyday politics and
highlights the paradoxes in people’s engagement with it: they tend to see politics
as “dirty” and “disturbing”, but are meanwhile attracted to the spectacle of it.
They have high expectations of it; they work hard to be part of it and they
dress up for electoral rallies. Spencer follows the path forged by Carl Schmitt
and Chantal Mouffe (without of course adopting the ideological outlook of
either author) in arguing that we miss the point when we think of politics as an
arena of deliberation and consultation, a privileged space of rational moderation
of conflicting interests. Instead, politics is inherently about defining friends and
foes. “The political” in Mouffe’s terms is inevitably antagonistic and its currency
consists of passions and group identities, rather than just interests (Mouffe 2005).
Conflict and politics are by no means oppositional categories and politics does not
put violence beyond use. Rather violence is “the heightened and intensified con-
tinuation of normal politics” (Spencer 2007, 120).
This view takes politics beyond a place like parliament and into the arena of
communities and the everyday practice of rivaling identity groups and political
entrepreneurs. The difficulty of separating religion from politics becomes
obvious. Religion is dynamic and heterogeneous and does not escape antagonism.
It can be seen as a “discursive tradition” that produces historically contingent cat-
egorizations of doctrine and practice (Asad 1986), framed and crafted by
struggles between groups who hold social power (Bayat 2007). Divergent reli-
gious interpretations thus upset pre-existing allegiances and orders and in
some cases produce severe turmoil. The notion of antagonism between identity
groups thus seems well positioned to explore the connections between religion
and politics. Indeed, the case of Akkaraipattu foregrounds the continuous
group tensions and the juggling and negotiation of discursive boundaries and col-
lective identities, and it is these processes that make the interaction between reli-
gion and politics legible.
The fact that people maneuver between positions and manipulate and repro-
duce boundaries reminds us that antagonism and group identities are not static
structures, but subject to agency and shaped by people’s everyday behavior.
People navigate the religious field in everyday life. More in line with the socio-
logical perspective taken here, Soarez and Osella advocate analyses of the ways
in which Muslims “produce themselves as modern religious subjects”, a “self-
fashioning” on the basis of a wide range of influences, uncertainties and
sources of inspiration (2009, 11). Rather than reducing the religious and the pol-
itical to each other, or alternatively, declare them incompatible, such an approach
investigates how people operate both in the religious and the political field.
Similar views can be found in the work of Bayat (2007), whose analysis of
Muslim engagement with politics in Egypt and Iran concludes that it is
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through “the politics of presence” that people determine a society’s religious and
political outlook. He highlights the blending of the public and the private in the
way Muslims forge boundaries, adjust practices and engage with politics.
… and in Sri Lanka
Studying the nexus between religion and politics thus requires qualitative and
fine-grained empirical analysis and it is to that approach that this article tries to
make a contribution. Rather than exploring the religio-political nexus by pinning
down the divide between the political and the spiritual, between the secular and
the religious, it focuses on the way people continuously define and redefine
boundaries and identities. To the extent that such analyses exist in relation to
Sri Lanka, they have been applied to Buddhism (e.g. Gombrich and Obeyesekere
1988). In his eloquent book, “The colors of the robe”, Ananda Abeysekera pro-
poses “an alternative understanding of religion and politics,” (2002, 80) and ven-
tures to “explore the Sinhala native configurations of narratives about Buddhism
and politics, locating arguments and counter-arguments about them.” (2002, 80)
The analysis of Sri Lankan Muslims, however, is much less developed.
In fact, it was only very recently that Muslim society emerged as a significant
issue area in Sri Lanka. There was some interesting historical (Dewaraja 1994;
Mohan 1987) and ethnographic work (McGilvray 1982) pre-dating the violent
conflict between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) that escalated in the 1980s. A limited number of studies
in the 1990s subsequently described the way the conflict transformed Muslim
discourses and political practice (Wagner 1990; O’Sullivan 1999; Ismail 1995;
Knoerzer 1998). A new wave of studies appeared with the advent of the peace
process in 2002. Through the peace talks, political leaders and analysts were
reminded of the fact that Sri Lanka’s third ethnic group is deeply entangled –
politically, geographically and otherwise – in what was sometimes mistakenly
seen as merely a Sinhala-Tamil conflict. The December 2004 tsunami, which
affected the Muslim community particularly badly, further boosted the attention
for this community (Hasbullah and Korf 2009; Lewer and Ismail 2011). In the
ensuing resumption of war, the Sri Lankan government pushed the LTTE out
of the Eastern Province in 2006 and declared a countrywide victory in May
2009. Throughout these years, the Muslims played a pivotal role, in terms of pol-
itical contestation and inter-ethnic relations, particularly in the east of the
country, which is ethnically and religiously the most diverse.
Recent publications focus on political dynamics and localized ethnic antagon-
ism (Goodhand and Klem 2005; ICG 2007 and 2008; Ismail 1995; Lewer and
Ismail 2011; McGilvray and Raheem 2007; Salman 2008; Uyangoda 2007).
Despite occasional activist and political overtones, some of the most insightful
and useful work on these issues was produced by Sri Lankan Muslim scholars
(Ali 2001; Ameerdeen 2006; Ismail, Abdullah and Fazil 2005; Nuhman 2002;
Zackariya and Shanmugaratnam 1997). Coming from a different angle, a much
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smaller number of authors have written about important social and religious
transformations in the Muslim community, such as new religious practices in
relation to ethnic and gender boundaries (Haniffa 2008) or changes in the appli-
cation of the traditional kudi (matriclan) system (McGilvray 2008; Ruwanpura
2006).
Unlike in most other parts of the world, the Muslims of Sri Lanka adamantly
define themselves not just as a religious, but also as an ethnic group. Scholars,
however, tend to take a constructivist perspective on ethnicity. In contrast to
local perceptions and everyday usage in Sri Lanka, they see it as a cognitively
and socially produced category. In his provocative contribution “ethnicity
without groups”, Rogers Brubaker argues that ethnic groups “are not things in
the world, but perspectives on the world.” (2004, 44) Such a perspective, tends
to encompass “a myth of common ancestry, shared memories, and cultural
elements; a link with a historic territory or homeland; and a measure of solidarity”
(Smith 1993, 28). In the case of Sri Lanka’s Muslims, this list creates as many
questions as it answers. Indeed, theMuslim ethnic label is a somewhat empty cat-
egory, a product of the struggle against its denial, against the counter image that
Muslims are none other than Islamic Tamils (for a discussion see Ismail 1995;
McGilvray and Raheem 2007).
The literature on Sri Lankan Muslims tends to analyze “ethnic”, “religious”,
and “political” issues separately. This is a major drawback, because it is evident
that these categories are strongly inter-related. In fact, the interaction between
these three realms plays a leading role in Sri Lanka’s present predicament.
Some of the writings produced by the Muslim polity – documents produced
by political and civil society leaders (e.g. Mohideen 2006) and more scholarly ana-
lyses (e.g. Ali 2001) – conveniently marry the religious and the ethnic sphere to
substantiate historic claims, minority rights and political aspirations. Such sources
thus fail to scrutinize the tension between the religious and the ethnic sphere.
Other scholars in turn adopted this rhetoric rather uncritically. O’Sullivan
(1999) for example reviews the rise of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress
(SLMC) in the 1990s and connects the ethno-political outlook of the party to
its Islamic discourse. She cites SLMC sources on “the Islamic notion that political
and religious leadership should not be separated” (1999, 258) and attributes a call
for jihad (335) to them, but in my view she misreads party political rhetoric as the
ascendancy of Islamist politics. When we move beyond the written documents
and political figureheads that she consulted, the presumed convergence of
ethnic sentiments, militant politics and religious fundamentalism proves
over-simplistic.
O’Sullivan’s account does not stand alone. More widely, the juxtaposition of
the terms Islam and armed conflict tends to invoke political and analytical knee-
jerk reactions in a post-9/11 world. Implicitly or explicitly, policy makers and ana-
lysts have searched for emergent jihadi tendencies in eastern Sri Lanka (see for
example ICG 2007). Rumors of frustrated Islamic youth, wahabi influences,
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uncanny armed groups, and inter-ethnic tensions have easily blended into com-
pelling stories, but they are typically void of robust empirical evidence. There is
thus a need for studies that scrutinize these interactions. This article does so with
a place-based study of Akkaraipattu, one among numerous towns along the east
coast where the context of war, ethnic tensions, religious revivalism and political
contestation collide (and converge) with each other.
THE VIEW FROM AKKARAIPATTU
First time visitors to Akkaraipattu (see map 1–4) will notice the clock tower
and the common features of a Sri Lankan rural town: a bustling market, bus
stand, shops and local restaurants lined up along the main road, which occasion-
ally gets congested with bullock carts, tractors, a flurry of motorbikes, and school-
going children. Travelers passing the town may note the striking difference
between the Islamic features of the northern half of the town and the Hindu
kovils (temples) and Christian churches in the southern half (see map 4).
The geography of ethnic enclaves that characterizes the east coast manifests
itself in the heart of the town: a fairly clear-cut division can be made between the
Muslim and the Tamil side. The former is a densely populated (37.000 people)
grid of walled alleys and lanes, accentuated by numerous shops and an occasional
villa. The southern half houses some 23.000 people and encompasses the cradle
of the town – the Pilliyar temple – and the old post office and hospital, schools
and government buildings. This side of town has a different, quieter feel to it.
Its appearance is greener and more spacious; the numerous traditional Tamil
houses – some of which are fairly run-down – are often separated by barbwire
or palm leaf fences, which are cheaper than walls. Both sides of town have
their own ethnic “hinterland”: neighboring northern settlements like Addelai-
chennai and Nintavur are Muslim, while one finds Tamil settlements (Tampad-
dai, Tambiluvil and Thirukovil) to the south. Further inland, there are Sinhala
villages and then Ampara town, the Sinhala dominated capital of the district
(map 2 and 3). Scholars with an interest in the region will know Akkaraipattu
through Dennis McGilvray’s detailed ethnography of the town (1982; 2008).
His primary focus lay with castes and kudis (clans) among the Tamils, but part
of his work highlights the deep historic inter-connections with the “Moorish”
community as well. Whilst the Muslims do not have castes, their kudi system is
largely an extension of the Tamil tradition. The system is matrilineal and matri-
local and in both communities it is the key regulatory mechanism for marriage,
dowry, and inheritance and thus reproduces socio-economic relations and hierar-
chies. As elsewhere in Sri Lanka, Islam came to Akkaraipattu through Muslim
traders who crossed the Indian Ocean centuries ago, settled and married local
(Tamil) women who converted to Islam. Religious practice was shaped by the
arrival of a Yemenite sheikh, who established a Sufi tradition (McGilvray
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2008). McGilvray’s account of social practice provides an exceptionally luxurious
basis for understanding a complicated town like Akkaraipattu. Yet, many ques-
tions remain unanswered, particularly those concerning recent religious trans-
formations in the Muslim community and the political developments
associated with the escalation of violent conflict in the past twenty-five years.
The Tamil militancy, military intervention, ethnic clashes, political strife,
breakaway factions and “gunmen” marked Akkaraipattu from the 1980s
onwards. As elsewhere in the north and east of the country, recruitment, extor-
tion, assassinations, and intimidation became hallmarks of everyday life. Ethnic
discrimination by the state, the language policy, and Sinhala-dominated coloniza-
tion schemes in the post-independence period raised anxiety among both Tamils
and Muslims. Particularly in the east, numerous Muslim youth are said to have
joined Tamil militant groups in their struggle against the state in the 1980s.
For reasons that were never fully elucidated, however, the Tamil rebels and
the Muslims broke apart. Throughout the 1990s, a long sequence of violent inci-
dents occurred between the Tamil and Muslim community, tearing apart the
deep historic socio-cultural ties between the two groups. The restoration of “nor-
malcy” announced with the 2002 ceasefire between the government and the
LTTE was short-lived. Despite the truce, ethnic tensions, assassinations, extor-
tion and intimidation continued and peaked when a split occurred within the
LTTE in March 2004. The December 2004 tsunami further disrupted people’s
lives. War resumed in 2006 and resulted in a government victory over the
LTTE in the east (2007) and the country at large (2009). The period of study
was thus rife with uncertainties, tensions and violent incidents.
THE TRANSFORMATION OF ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS IDENTITY
The following paragraphs will discuss some of the remarkable changes that
have taken place in the ethnic, political and religious realm in the past twenty-five
years. The war has had multiple and paradoxical impacts on Akkaraipattu’s
Muslim community. The following four inter-connected developments form
the empirical core of this article: 1) a hardening of ethnic fault lines, 2) the
increasingly ethno-territorial meaning attached to Sufism, 3) the attempt to
unify the Muslim community through the creation of the Mosque Federation,
and 4) the project of Islamic purification propagated by Tabligh Jamaat.
Hardening ethnic fault lines
The eastern coastal belt is known for its long history of interconnections
between Tamils and Muslims. This is reflected in cross-group similarities in
the kudi system and social organization. Akkaraipattu is one of the few places
where a Muslim and a Tamil enclave actually form one town, but the ethnic
rift is as manifest in Akkaraipattu as it is throughout the east. Already prior to
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Figure 1. Maps of Sri Lanka, the East, Greater Akkaraipattu, Akkaraipattu Town.
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the escalation of hostilities, political contestation resulted in an administrative
break-up. In the early 1980s, separate divisions were created for the Tamil
(Alayadivembu division) and the Muslim (Akkaraipattu division) part of town.
This resulted in a tug of war around the exact location of the new boundary, as
the ethnic geography and the position of key facilities – the market, the bus
stand, the Grand Mosque, the Catholic Church – defied a clear-cut divide.
The escalation of conflict further reinforced the ethnic fault line. In an
attempt to establish control, both the Tamil rebels and the state security forces
resorted to severe measures. They targeted the two ethnic communities in differ-
ent ways and thus compounded the Tamil-Muslim rift. The LTTE came to see
Muslims as menacing traitors and acted accordingly. The security forces saw
the Tamil community as a potential security threat; intimidation, round-ups,
arrests, torturous interrogations, killings and disappearances thus affected
them particularly badly.
The national conflict often became manifest in Akkaraipattu through more
localized struggles. In 1985, a fight between Muslim and Tamil users of the
market place got out of hand and the rebels took their revenge on Muslim
traders by burning it down. In 1990, ethnic anxiety and contestation over land
led Muslims to destroy a Hindu Temple (see the shattered image on the right
of map 4). Grenade attacks and sudden escalations of violence have been rife.
Carved into the collective local memory, such incidents fortify the division
between the two communities. Traditional linkages and inter-personal relations
have been under pressure.
The schism between the two communities is aggravated by unequal access to
political power and patronage networks. The ability of Muslim political leaders to
tap into such networks has borne fruits for the Muslim division, as evidenced by
the general state of the infrastructure: the base hospital, roads, a conference hall,
and the prestigious Islamic gates at the northern entry of town. The numerous
shops, petrol sheds and restaurants are evidence of greater mobility among
Muslims. They could cross military checkpoints to do business in Colombo
more smoothly than Tamils, though the general trading tradition attributed to
the Muslims may be a factor here as well. It would nevertheless be a mistake
to single out a Tamil and a Muslim economy. Both are in fact deeply connected:
economic exchange between the Tamils and Muslims is highly common in
Akkaraipattu. Tamil labor is vital for Muslim construction projects and agricul-
ture. Hiring, selling and buying take place on a daily basis, though it must be
added that the Muslim community tends to be the more powerful actor in econ-
omic exchange.
The paradoxical combination of ethnically colored conflict and economic
inter-dependence drives the pulse of life in Akkaraipattu. The situation oscillates
between sudden eruptions of tension and violence and subsequent resumptions
of “normalcy” through trade, agriculture, school and so on. Community leaders as
well as workers and traders on both sides of the divide agree that economic
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interests are a driving force in ending temporal crises. The common cadence
tends to encompass general tensions, a violent incident and possibly a reprisal,
which in turn result in a public shut down (hartal) imposed by either side.
Whilst efforts are made to defuse the crisis, people in both communities –
employees, employers, sellers, consumers – are eager to continue their everyday
struggle for income and the situation gradually returns to square one. Neither
side can afford to let enmity get in the way for more than a few days.
The reinvigorated genealogy of Sufi shrines
Wet rice has historically formed the heart of Akkaraipattu’s economy. The
irrigated rice fields surrounding the town are subject to increasing competition
due to population growth and ethno-political boundaries. This has resulted in
local conflicts, which were further complicated by the context of state sponsored
land colonization, ethnic contestation, guerrilla warfare, and tsunami relocation.
Land, in fact, became a conjunction of economic interests, ethnic anxieties, and
genealogical claims. The shrine at Ambalattaru forms an interesting example.
The mosque was erected in a rather remote location some 17 kilometers
southwest of town (see map 3). There are contesting accounts of the date of erec-
tion. Some claim it dates back to the 17th Century, but the more plausible account
that came out of McGilvray’s work (private communication) suggests the shrine
was built in the early 1950s when the jungle was cleared for the Gal Oya irrigation
scheme. Legend has it that the earth-moving equipment froze up and the pre-
viously unknown saint Sikander emerged in a dream to explain he had been
buried in the forest for centuries. The mosque was thus built to appease him
with a saint tomb. There is a long history of Sri Lankan Muslims worshipping
such tombs inside mosques to make vows and ask for help with their problems.
Whilst the rituals and symbols are Islamic, shrines like this have attracted Hindus
and Christians as well (McGilvray 2008, 273–275).
The location of the Ambalattaru mosque bestowed it with special impor-
tance. What used to be a peripheral jungle later became a controversial ethnic
borderland. The shrine became the marker of a fault line that not only defined
claims on farmland, but an ethnic space and a historic right to inhabit that
space as well. It lies on the very edge of the paddy fields, on the verge
between the Muslim and Tamil dominated coastline and the Sinhala dominated
inland. Beyond the mosque, one finds jungle on one side and the Sinhala settle-
ments created under the Gal Oya irrigation scheme on the other. Poor Sinhala
farmers from the south were brought in to exploit the newly gained agricultural
potential. As elsewhere in the north and east, these developments invoked
Tamil and Muslim anxieties about Sinhala encroachment (McGilvray 2008;
Moore 1985). This led the Muslim leadership to attract new Muslim farmers
to the area. They were brought in all the way from Welimade (a Sinhala speaking
area in Sri Lanka’s central highlands). Apparently, the political compromise at the
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time required the new settlers to speak Sinhala. Ambalattaru was given a Sinha-
lized name: Ambalam Oya.
With time, the mosque started to decay, but when ethno-political contesta-
tion flared up again in the 1980s and 1990s, it resurfaced on the political radar.
A local Muslim politician renovated the building and SLMC leader Ashraff pro-
vided electricity. The mosque thus experienced a rebirth, which had little to do
with religious dynamics, but everything with the land politics of the time.
Every morning there is a vow-making ceremony and pilgrims come from all
across the east coast to pray and ask for help. Over 10.000 attend the annual fes-
tival, dignitaries at the mosque told me, and they bring cows and other offerings.
Sufi followers in Ambalattaru and other Sufi shrines in the region, voiced anxiety
during interviews that more puritan Muslim reform movements (mainly Tawhid
Jamaat) oppose these traditions and heritages. But in the east of Sri Lanka,
Muslims have to cling on to their history, they explained, because they are
under threat from Sinhala and Tamil nationalists, who argue that Muslims are
not from this soil. Shrines like the one in Ambalattaru are pivotal for the
Muslims’ sense of belonging and they play a vital role in contemporary interpret-
ations of “ancient” history.
The mosque thus assumed new significance in the region’s ethno-political
field. Genealogy, belonging and the historical nexus between place and religion
became paramount for a minority community that perceives itself as “under
siege”. Rather than a mere prayer house, the mosque provides meaning to con-
temporary notions of place and belonging, a boundary between “us” and “them”.
It became a marker of a discourse that implicitly emanates notions like “tra-
ditional homeland” and “sons of the soil”, both dominant features of Tamil and
Sinhala nationalism.
The mosque federation
Apart from transforming the symbolic and territorial meaning attached to
mosques, the conflict has also affected the role of mosque organizations in
society. Mirroring the institutional setup of Hindu temples, mosques have long
been administered by kudi-based trustee boards. Until the 1980s the role of
these boards was mostly confined to the religious realm and its wider worldly
significance was declining. This becomes clear from McGilvray’s work (2008,
275–279) as well as interviews with one of the former chairmen of the federation
and other Muslim leaders. Board members were selected from the
mosque-affiliated kudis to settle disputes within the mosque constituency and
run mosque affairs, like maintenance and religious festivals. In response to the
insecurity and ethnic tensions, that role has changed in a major way.
Akkaraipatttu’s three main mosques jointly founded a federation in 1983 to
oversee social activities and facilitate the implementation of shariah law. Neigh-
boring towns followed suit with similar bodies. Soon after, in 1985, the first ethnic
clashes caused havoc in Akkaraipattu and the Muslim community felt an urgent
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need to get organized. People expected the Islamic leaders to settle inter-ethnic
problems and disputes on their behalf. In the following fifteen years, the federa-
tion became strongly preoccupied with preserving the unity and safety of the
Muslim community.
The 2002 peace talks between the government and the LTTE further inten-
sified this role. Instigated riots, high profile killings, extortions and disappear-
ances ravaged the region as the LTTE, the army and Muslim politicians
competed for control in the shadow of the formal negotiations about the
region’s political future. The following incident is illustrative of the federation’s
capacity to settle such unruly situations. During a Friday morning prayer in
November 2005, a volatile period because of the presidential elections at the
time, Tamil rebels threw a grenade into the praying crowd at the Grand
Mosque, killing eight and wounding some thirty-five Muslims. The mosque
lies right on the ethnic fault line. The rebels quickly made their way out,
leaving behind a shocked and furious Muslim crowd, which was ready to take
revenge on the Tamil part of town. Sri Lanka’s history is rife with ethnic riots,
even pogroms, sparked by incidents like this. In this particular case, however,
the escalation of violence was prevented, because the religious leaders stepped
in. The maulavi preaching in the mosque when the grenade exploded told me
he addressed the crowd, saying: “please behave like real human beings. Don’t
do any harm to anyone.” He said this through the mosque loudspeakers immedi-
ately after the incident. They turned the volume up, so even in the Tamil area it
could be heard. Meanwhile, the police moved in with armored cars and all the
troops they could spare. Muslim leaders continued to talk to the crowd saying:
“don’t go harm anyone. This is the result of madness. Don’t go hurt the
Tamils. […] Allah will take care of it, you go home.” The maulavis were successful
and an outright ethnic clash was averted (see also Goodhand et al. 2009).
Islamization and Tabligh Jamaat
In parallel to the war-related developments discussed above, remarkable
changes occurred in the religious sphere. In the past three decades, the
number of mosques has increased rapidly and the practice of alms giving has
been formalized in a Zakat foundation. Public displays of Islam – dress,
haircut, beard – have changed as well. More pious inhabitants of the town
prided themselves in pointing out that an increasing number of men shave
their heads and grow their beards. Some women have started to wear a black
niqab that fully covers their face (though this is not as common as in some
other towns in the east, most notably Kattankudy). This Islamization process
was mainly spearheaded by Tabligh Jamaat, an Islamic reform movement. It
was founded by the Indian Islamic scholar Muhammad Ilyas in the 1920s to
call on Muslims to bring their everyday life in line with Islam. The credo of
the movement can be summarized in his quote “O Muslims, become
Muslims”. Whilst relatively little has been written about Tabligh, they have
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become a big player, certainly in South Asia, but also globally (Ahmad 1991;
Metcalf 1982; Robinson 2007; Sikand 2007). The movement spread along Sri
Lanka’s east coast and to Akkaraipattu in the 1970s. Other groups –
Jamaat-i-Islami and Tawhid Jamaat – came to the town as well, but their presence
remains small. In many mosques and in the mosque federation Tabligh Jamaat
has a strong presence and presently they are building a large dedicated Tabligh
mosque along the main road.
Tablighis aim to “purify” Islam from “undesirable” customs that Islam has
blended with during the centuries of its expansion. Sufi practices like mysticism,
meditation and saint worship are tolerated as an advanced form of Islam, but they
are not encouraged. Tablighis see themselves as a da’wa movement, that is they
educate the rural masses and disentangle them from “un-Islamic” habits (Robinson
2007; Sikand 2007). During my fieldwork Tablighis proudly presented their teach-
ings as “simple”, as a way of life that anyone can adopt. They shun theological
debate and interpret purification in terms of doing everyday things – eating,
praying, dressing and so on – in an Islamic way (see also Ahmad 1991; Metcalf
1982). All can reach the afterlife by following this very simple path, according to
their belief.
Tabligh Jamaat is horizontally organized and claims not to have elaborate
financial or institutional structures. Members are not recorded and for this
reason it is hard to estimate the size of Tabligh’s following, but one Tablighi esti-
mated the number of active members in Akkaraipattu at one thousand at the time
of research. “Jamaat visits” form the core of its activity: members of the move-
ment travel to other places (neighboring villages or abroad) for some days,
weeks or months for devotional practice and spreading the word to other
Muslims. These visits take place on a regular basis, often by men, but in some
cases women are brought along as well.
I have not been able to reconstruct how exactly Tabligh Jamaat entered
Akkaraipattu, but Victor de Munck’s analysis (1998) of the arrival of the move-
ment in a village in Moneragala District, further south, provides a plausible
illustration. Interestingly, the non-Tablighi villagers De Munck describes
acknowledged that their white-clad, bearded visitors propagate the proper
Islam, but they avoided interaction with them, sighed with relief when they sur-
vived the visit without being converted and made inappropriate jokes about them
at the local store afterwards. They thus averted absorption into the movement,
but did not challenge the Tablighi concept of purity. This purification concept
is the leading theme for those who did join the movement as well. One
member I interviewed in Akkaraipattu said the following: “Before I joined
Tabligh, I had no life. I didn’t go to the mosque and I didn’t obey my parents.
[…] Before, I thought my life was spoilt. I joined Tabligh because I felt
I needed to correct my life. Go the path of Allah.”
Remarkably, the Tabligh purification project steers clear of ethnicity
altogether. They actively try to shut out key planks in above-discussed Sufi
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discourse of genealogy and a local sense of belonging, and the inter-ethnic
dimension escapes their narratives. Tabligh is all about Muslim identity, but
the movement explicitly disconnects itself from worldly matters like identity poli-
tics and ethnic strife, because they are seen as impure, inherently divisive, and a
source of trouble. “We don’t worry about politics, shariah, or an Islamic state,”
one member said. Another added: “I don’t believe we can decide by politics.
God is the decision maker. Politicians can’t decide over the life of the people.”
Politics were the cause of Sri Lanka’s “ethnic problem”, and they will not help
resolve it. “The solution will come if the Muslims obey the word of Allah. With
politics, one problem is solved and another one will come.”
Divergent Muslim identities, demarcations and notions of purity
As becomes clear from the above developments, the war and the hardening
of ethnic fault lines have had great impact in Akkaraipattu. That impact goes
beyond a simple us/them divide, however. It is not just a story of violence and
the mobilization of identity leading to a segregation of Muslims from Tamils
and in turn a unification of Muslims around Islam. The religious field harbors
multiple trajectories. We have witnessed how a Sufi shrine became an ethno-
territorial marker in the politics of place, a mosque federation that expanded
its role to deal with violence and contention, and an Islamic purification
project (Tabligh Jamaat) that steers clear from ethnicity and politics. These devel-
opments all pivot around an increased awareness of identity. Indeed, it matters a
whole lot more to be Muslim now that this category determines friend/foe
relationships and security conditions. Islamic institutions are thus preoccupied
with demarcating Muslim from non-Muslim, but they define “Muslimness” in
rather different ways.
In the case of the Ambalattaru shrine, Muslimness airs ethnic genealogy and
territorial belonging. For Tabligh Jamaat, on the other hand, the category Muslim
denotes a sense of religious purity. It is a deliberate move away from territory and
genealogy; Islamization is about shedding those un-Islamic influences. Tabligh
Jamaat’s discourse is about the global umma; divisions along lines of nationality
and ethnicity are secondary. The mosque federation, on the other hand, has an
explicitly local focus. It is about uniting the community and shutting out divisive
influences and external threats.
One important distinction concerns the relation of these discourses and insti-
tutions to “the political”, which brings us to the next step in this paper: the para-
doxical relations between religion and politics. The case of Akkaraipattu flags
divergent connections. The mosque federation constitutes the expansion of a
previously merely religious body into a broader scope of public action. It tries
to address politically charged problems by uniting the community and by mobiliz-
ing political leaders. The Ambalattaru Sufi shrine, on the other hand, sheds a
rather different light on the political connection. Politicians funded the refurbish-
ment of the mosque to bolster their image as good Muslim patrons and thus
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reach out to relevant vote banks. Tabligh, thirdly, claims to be neither about
patronage, nor about principled politics. They stay out of politics altogether,
because it is a divisive factor that generates problems rather than resolving
them, members of the movement would not get tired of saying. Somewhat sche-
matically, we could thus distinguish principled politics (concerned with the rights
and anxieties of a population group), pragmatic politics (pivoting around patron-
age) and anti-politics (attempts to turn away from politics at large). Whilst such
firm discursive positions are important to understand, readers will not be sur-
prised to find people circumventing principles or jockeying between discourses
in the section below. As Akkaraipattu oscillates between escalations of violence
and resumptions of relative peace, different outlooks and boundaries are acti-
vated and de-activated. The religious field conditions people’s possibilities, but
does not script their behavior altogether.
RELIGION, POLITICS AND PATRONAGE
Let me shortly change perspective here and look at the role of politicians.6
The unruliness of the electorate and the dialectic between principled and prag-
matic politics are a challenge for them. To understand their position, we need to
take the broader narrative of modern Muslim politics in Sri Lanka on board.
Even a nutshell summary sketches the dynamics quite clearly. Pragmatism
was the dominant feature of Muslim politics up to the mid-1980s. Muslim poli-
ticians tended to engage in what O’Sullivan (1999) has labeled “the politics of
access”: they managed to deliver patronage to their electorates by adopting a
non-militant stance within the two mainstream (Sinhala dominated) parties.
In Akkaraipattu, Uthama Lebbe was a prominent example of this approach.
During the 1980s, a more militant discourse of Muslim ethno-nationalism
and minority rights emerged. This was manifest in the creation of the
Muslim United Liberation Front (MULF), founded by Akkaraipattu’s activist
M.I.M. Mohideen, and its more successful parallel: the SLMC, run by M.H.
M. Ashraff (from Kalmunai). Both parties propagated Muslim rights and a
form of self-determination, thus partly mirroring Tamil nationalism.
However, the MULF never became a powerful player and the SLMC only sur-
vived because its ethno-nationalist ambitions were trumped by realpolitik.
Despite its Islamic outlook and presentation, it joined Sinhala-led adminis-
trations from opposite sides of the political spectrum to secure ministerial
posts. Politics of access thus continued – be it with a shift of patronage
towards east Sri Lanka. The ethno-political rhetoric of the SLMC could have
potentially united the Muslim community under one banner, but its patronage
6In addition to interviews in Akkaraipattu, this sections draws from discussions with Muslim
politicians and analysts throughout the country throughout recent years.
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politics had the opposite effect. Town-based patrimonial networks of individual
“big men”, like A.L.M. Athaulla in Akkaraipattu, divided the party. After the
death of Ashraff in 2000, these politicians competed for ministerial posts,
either on an SLMC ticket or with their own electoral vehicles.
Politicians like Athaulla have to juggle. Being too militant would bar their
access to key positions, but they cannot be unresponsive to the various pressures
from their constituency either. To garner support, they must navigate the div-
isions within that constituency. How to engage with the ethnic geography of a
Sufi shrine without antagonizing Tablighis? Overly outspoken ideologies –
Islamism, ethno-nationalism – create difficulties for them, because they divide
their vote banks or impede their ability to join government. Instead the tendency
is to make oneself unassailable as the town patron by monopolizing patronage.
The engagement with religion therefore tends to centre not on political issues,
but on symbolism – funding mosques, constructing religious landmarks, and fra-
ternizing with respected religious leaders. The message of the two big Islamic
entry gates spanning the main road and the modern conference centre (see
map 4) will not be lost on a visitor entering Akkaraipattu: this is the town of
A.L.M. Athaulla (his name and picture are clearly posted), he is a good Muslim
and he is making Akkaraipattu prosperous. At the 2008 Provincial Council elec-
tions, he assembled mosque leaders and the mosque federation and told them
whom the people should vote for. The patrimonial logic thus connects religion
and politics in a marriage of convenience. It does not engage in theological
debate or setting religiously inspired political objectives. Big men engage with
religion through symbols, people and institutions to connect to their clientele.
THE POLITICAL, POLITICS AND ANTI-POLITICS IN PRACTICE
The view from below highlights similar difficulties in balancing contradictory
loyalties. The community and religious leadership in Akkaraipattu use both pol-
itical and anti-political behavior in their everyday struggle for survival. On one
hand they have to do politics, to deal with immediate crises, as the grenade inci-
dent at the Grand Mosque illustrated, but also on a personal level: to safeguard
jobs and personal favors. On the other hand, people in Akkaraipattu have plenty
of reason to turn away from politics. Not only because they see politics as abject
and impure, but also because it tends to endanger everyday security and survival.
As usual, there are important differences in Akkaraipattu between what people
say they do and what they actually do, particularly in relation to something inher-
ently controversial like politics. People air discourses about politics or anti-
politics, but in fact they practice both. The paragraphs below discuss some
examples of how people negotiate the various discursive contradictions and
limitations.
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Let me start with the testimony of a senior civil servant who has previously
enjoyed influential positions in Akkaraipattu’s religious establishment. Religious
leaders will present themselves as pious and non-political, he explained, but at
election time, their mosques and constituencies become political currency and
they cannot resist the pressure. Politicians will use them to marshal support
and if they object, they will face problems. “It may not be right, but we think
like this. We need a job for our son, so we go to the minister. That’s how elections
work here. To get Samurdhi [government support for the poor], a loan, anything,
you go through the minister. He calls me in the office ‘do this, do that’ and makes
me contravene our own policy and break the law. But he says: ‘I’ll look after it.
You must do it. What are you telling.’” Political power thus trumps anti-political
conviction when push comes to shove on a personal level. He continued: “Even
people who follow Tabligh and Tawhid need personal favors. To the outside they
are anti-political, but inside it’s different. I have also called friends to tell them do
this and that. Violence is also used. Even the police and army would come in for
certain purposes.”
A second example concerns the personal struggle that a senior member of
Tabligh Jamaat shared with me. He is one of the members of the movement
who is particularly insistent with regard to piety. As an educated person, he
will eloquently explain why politics will not lead to anything. One day, SLMC
leader Ashraff sent two people to invite him to speak at a political meeting. He
explained his position, but they suggested he should speak about the need for
Muslim unity, a message he could not disagree with. He could not withstand
their pressure, but, he added, “I spoke only about God. Not about politics.”
While this Tabligh leader upheld his personal boundary, he became part of a pol-
itical event and his participation will have boosted its political symbolism and
legitimacy.
The Mosque Federation, a third example, is itself a manifestation of contra-
dictions. It sees itself as a religious organization that contrasts itself with the polity
(like the Tablighis), but it also constitutes a response to the ethnic violence in the
1980s and its narrative emanates locality, belonging and ethnic geography (like
the Ambalattaru shrine). In addition, the federation engaged with formal politics
as it tried to optimize the vote by uniting the Muslims in elections. This, however,
proved to be beyond their capacity; other forces trying to influence voting behav-
ior proved stronger. Then, the federation attempted with increasing vigor to
influence the course of Muslim political leaders. As the war progressed, the fed-
eration joined hands with other mosque federations, first at district and later at
provincial level, to advocate Muslim aspirations. With the 2002 peace process,
Muslim anxieties peaked as their political future was debated in the absence of
a Muslim delegation. Popular declarations were launched in Muthur and at the
university campus in Oluvil (near Ninthavur) (map 2) to propagate the Muslim
rights to ethnic self-determination and demand that Muslim political leaders
defend such a position. The mosque federation was one of the forces behind
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these statements. In addition, they set up meetings with various Muslim poli-
ticians, calling on them to overcome their differences and reunite in one
Muslim front, but this failed. The Muslim polity remains divided and no separate
delegation was added to the peace talks (which had started to collapse anyway).
The Mosque Federation thus spans principled, pragmatic and anti-politics. It
tries to deal with the political in an anti-political way by keeping the distorting
and divisive influence of politics out (for example during the mosque incident),
but meanwhile it attempts to influence politics, by calling on politicians to
engage with the political in a more responsible way (lobby during the peace
process).7
CONCLUSION
This article contributes to the wider literature on contemporary Islam and
politics that takes issue with dominant concepts like secularism and Islamism
and the debate about Islam’s relation to modernity and liberal democracy.
These writings debunk the idea that any political system is essential to Islam
and posit that more contextualized and nuanced approaches are needed to under-
stand the variegated interface between Islam and politics. So far, this literature
has remained largely disconnected from Sri Lankan studies. Whilst Sri Lankan
Muslims have become a somewhat fashionable topic in recent years, there is a
tendency to either deal with the religious and the political angle separately, or
subsume one into the other. This article has shown that the dynamic between
the religious and the political is much less straightforward and in fact harbors a
number of paradoxes. Identity issues have assumed an omnipresent importance
in course of the war in Sri Lanka: it matters a whole lot more to be or not to be
Muslim now that it defines friend and foe, ethnic geographies and everyday
security. However, the meanings attached to that category – Muslim – vary and
this leads to paradoxical differences of emphasis: the ethnic dimension versus
the religious one, local versus global, political versus anti-political and so on.
Salient examples presented in this article included the discourse around the
Ambalattaru Sufi shrine, which thrives onMuslim genealogy and the need to pre-
serve the purity of a historical Muslim place under threat of Sinhala encroach-
ment. Tabligh Jamaat followers on the other hand define purity in terms of
7My colleague, Hasbullah, informed me about a tantalizing fourth example that unfolded while this
article was being prepared for print. Cegu Issadeen, Akkaraipattu’s second-most influential poli-
tician and Athaulla’s main competitor, abruptly left politics and became a Sufi leader. He started
his own “ashram” and quickly became an enchanted religious figure. His meditation centre – a
scenic site just outside the town with a shrine, a cave, and a stage for open-air sermons – attracts
a large audience, from Akkaraipattu or further afield, both Muslims and some Tamils. They come
for worship and devotion, but the site has also become popular for family visits and picnics and the
ashram has started to issue entrance tickets. Issadeen's remarkable move from politics to religion
shows just how thin the apparent opposition between the two realms can be.
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Islamization and see ethnic sentiments and local politics as worldly digressions.
Coming from a different angle, the Muslim ethno-nationalist discourse steers
clear from religion, which in turn poses a challenge for Muslim politicians,
who engage with Islamic leaders and symbols rather superficially and opportunis-
tically. Meanwhile the mosque federation present themselves as apolitical, but
when they try to orchestrate community behavior (by preventing pogroms or
trying to unify the vote) they enter a highly political domain. In all these cases,
the Muslim identity is pivotal, but the resulting religio-political connections or
disconnections diverge.
This observationmatters, because it helps explain some of the divisions within
Sri Lanka’s Muslim community at large. It helps resolve the puzzle of a group of
people that often fails to unite around shared interests to jointly face common
enemies, despite facing major existential threats: from the state and from the
rebels, from Sinhalese and Tamils, from Christians and Buddhists. Furthermore,
it counters implicit and explicit prophecies of imminent Muslim “jihadi” violence
by wahabi-inspired groups. Instead, this article highlights the internal cleavages
of identity politics: the war has united and divided the Muslims. It moves
beyond a dichotomy of “radical” and “moderate” Muslims and the question of
who is going to emerge on top. Rather than a struggle between dissatisfied
armed youth falling pray to fundamentalism on one hand and liberal peaceful cos-
mopolitan Muslims on the other, we witness a much wider variety of discourses
propagating divergent ethnic, religious and political sentiments. And as a result
there are intra-Muslim fissures, contradictory political outlooks, paradoxical
notions of purity and different ways of defining ingroup and outgroup. Rather
than a dichotomy of two fronts (be they labeled as traditional/modern, radical/
moderate, piety/politics, or fundamentalist/secular), people position themselves
in different ways as they navigate their everyday life in a context that oscillates
between violent skirmishes and periods of relative peace. They employ different
discourses to engage or disengage with politics and if their principles do not suit
the situation, they find pragmatic ways to circumvent them. What is deeply pol-
itical at one instance may re-appear as pious the next, depending on the occasion.
As a result of these convolutions, the religious field cannot simply be singled
out. Far from a privileged spiritual arena, it is structured by incidents of violence,
patrimonial loyalties, political contestation, and ethnic identity issues. Muslim
identities are not merely a function of religious dogma, but result from continu-
ous reproduction through social relations, religious traditions and reform move-
ments, economic activities, violence and political dynamics. This article thus
supports the emphasis of recent studies on the ways contemporary Muslims
produce themselves in their everyday life (Bayat 2007; Soares and Osella
2009). That does not mean, however that the religious field is entirely contingent,
or that no overall trends can be identified. Important changes are taking place:
Islamization, a hardening of ethnic fault lines, the soaring importance of locality
and genealogy, and the context of protracted insecurity. These changes bear
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testimony to the fact that the religious field is influenced by various factors.
Armed conflict, ethno-nationalism, and the proliferation of trans-national move-
ments like Tabligh all had an impact on the way religion and politics interact, but
this impact was neither homogeneous nor hegemonic. Violence and ethnic con-
testation have raised the stakes, but this applies both to political and to anti-
political behavior. To return to the metaphor of Muslim prayer on a ferry cited
at the inception of this article, religion does not remain unaffected when it
enters new terrain. The current, wind, and the waves exert force, but their influ-
ences are not uniform; they may work with or against each other. War, ethnicity
and Islamic revival movements raise questions of orientation, identity and bound-
aries, but rather than clear answers, we find multiple trajectories and divergent
individual ways of navigating the prevalent conditions.
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